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Michael Kirby once published an article in which he argued that his 
"structuralist theatre" was an approach to performance which might justifiably be 
deemed "nonsemiotic." Drawing an analogy with Rorschach ink blot tests, Kirby 
declared that his theatre worked "against sending a message about something."1 
Any meanings inferred by the spectator from the performance, he argued, would 
be nonsemiotic, because they fall outside of the criteria set by Umberto Eco for 
semiotic inference: 
[Eco] explains that certain acts of inference "must be 
recognized as semiotic acts" but only when they are "culturally 
recognized and systematically coded." This places the 
emphasis on a culturally established code and distinguishes 
private, personal, idiosyncratic interpretation from semiotic 
analysis. Semiotics, then, is not the exegesis of meaning, but 
the demonstration of how meaning derives from a particular 
code; unless the code itself is clear, we have only 
interpretation. (Kirby 106) 
At the end of this article Kirby endeavors to explain just what the relationship is 
between his plays and the audience: it is, he tells us, a sort of formalism which 
"is concerned with the way the mind works to make connections between things," 
and relates to the audience in a manner that creates "new emotions, emotions that 
cannot be derived from nature or from messages" (110, 111). 
There are two main problems apparent in Kirby's argument: (1) his 
dubious exclusion of any "culturally established code" from his structuralist 
theatre; and (2) his nebulous explanation of the consequent interaction between 
performance and audience. With regard to the first problem, it seems clear that 
the simple act of offering a performance to paying spectators entails some sort of 
"culturally established code" right off the bat. Moreover, where Kirby insists 
that any meanings which the audience educes from his work will quickly "arise 
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and disappear" (110), we might reply that while this would undoubtedly make the 
task of semiotic analysis more difficult, it is, theoretically speaking, in no way 
inconsistent with the interests of semiotics. With regard to the second problem, 
we may object that the phrase "the way the mind works to make connections 
between things" is so all-inclusive as to be meaningless, and that these "emotions 
that cannot be derived from nature or messages" are neither demonstrated nor 
specifically indicated. 
It appears, therefore, that Kirby's argument for the possibility of a "non-
semiotic" theatre is insupportable. As Marvin Carlson has commented: 
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine and perhaps impossible to 
describe just what such a performance would be like, since we 
could talk or think about it only with the tools provided by our 
culture. One would have to imagine an experience created 
entirely by chance, involving elements bearing no meaning, and 
perceived by audiences whose culture provided them with no 
way of making sense of this experience. The result might be 
something like the "one great blooming buzzing confusion" that 
William James postulates as the experience of the newborn 
baby before any differentiation of experiential phenomena has 
begun (675). 
Assuming, then, that the possibility of a theatrical performance devoid of semiotic 
elements is non-existent, the question remains as to whether a theatrical 
performance has any elements which can legitimately be considered 
"nonsemiotic." In Great Reckonings in Little Rooms: On the Phenomenology of 
Theater Bert O. States answers the question in the affirmative, and it is the 
purpose of this essay to analyze the reasoning which lies behind this assertion. 
It should be emphasized that the position of States is by no means 
identical to that of Kirby. The most important point of divergence is that States 
in no way suggests that there might be a "non-semiotic" theatre: rather, he 
observes that semiotic elements are present in all communication, but argues that 
semiotic analysis cannot account for an audience member's entire experience of 
the theatrical event. It is "disturbing," States tells us, that semiotics evinces "an 
implicit belief that you have exhausted a thing's interest when you have explained 
how it works as a sign" (7). In his view, semiotics is heir to the mimetic 
approach to criticism in that, insofar as semiotics is concerned with "signs" (and 
so, by implication, "signifieds"), its scope is essentially limited to referential 
themes. It is in this respect, he argues, that semiotics falls short, for any account 
of a spectator's whole experience would have to accept that attention was focused 
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not only on what a given work of art signified, but on the corporeal elements of 
the work itself. Hence, States comes to declare that "plainly there is something 
deficient about the referential principle as a basis for art" (5). 
States offers instead an approach in which semiotics is partnered equally 
with phenomenology, and he cites theoretical precedent for this in Horace's 
pairing of "instruction" with "delight" in the Ars Poetica. The allusion is useful, 
for such a reference to traditional dramatic criticism may help us to keep our 
bearings through some of States' murkier passages. With regard to this principle, 
and even while acknowledging that Horace is the earliest critic to set forth such 
an explicit division of theatrical experience, it may be valuable to glance back to 
an even earlier prototype, Aristotle. 
Needless to say, it is the Poetics which has been most influential in the 
history of dramatic theory, and because of its most famous passage ("Tragedy is 
an imitation of an action . . ."), Aristotle is associated for the most part with 
mimetically based theory. There are, however, other passages in Aristotle's work 
where he leans a little towards a phenomenological approach. In Politics, for 
example, Aristotle writes this of education in music: 
Rhythm and melody supply imitations of anger and gentleness, 
and also courage and temperance, and of all the qualities 
contrary to these, and of the other qualities of character, which 
hardly fall short of the actual affections, as we know from our 
own experience, for in listening to such strains our souls 
undergo a change. The habit of feeling pleasure or pain at 
mere representations is not far removed from the same feeling 
about realities; for example, if any one delights in the sight of 
a statue for its beauty only, it necessarily follows that the sight 
of the original will be plesant to him. The objects of no other 
sense, such as taste or touch, have any resemblance to moral 
qualities; in visible objects there is only a little, for there are 
figures which are of a moral character, but only to a slight 
extent, and all do not participate in the feeling about them.2 
Even in the Poetics he makes a related point when he argues that "Spectacle has 
[. . .] an emotional attraction of its own."3 These passages suggest that even 
Aristotle felt that a full understanding of the arts required the incorporation of 
something like "phenomenological" analysis, an approach which, we may infer, 
could be extended at the very least to such related theatrical elements as the 
musical aspects of speech, or the physical attractions of actors, and perhaps even 
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as far as the affinities which resonate between the structure of a play and the 
responsive mechanisms of the audience. 
Short of setting out the whole litany of quasi-phenomenological 
references in the history of dramatic theory, it will be helpful to take notice of a 
few of the more notable analogues in the work of certain theorists before moving 
on to the more specific philosophical context of States' approach. An argument 
which is especially worth looking at is Diderot's. Like Aristotle, Diderot assumes 
that one of the great pleasures of theatre is its resemblance to the "real" world; 
but this pleasure in illusion is pointedly set within the awareness of the artificiality 
of the circumstances. Consequently, Diderot's suggestion that those staging Le 
fils naturel should "en un mot, transporter au théâtre le salon de Clairville, 
comme il est"4 anticipates, in a way, both States' fundamental conception of the 
theatre as a devourer of reality and his sense of the delectation which the audience 
finds in this fact. 
With a little care, we can even pin Diderot up against the broad 
distinction made by Horace (and harked back to by States) between "instruction" 
and "delight"; for Diderot's understanding of the pleasure the audience takes in 
the means of representation goes hand in hand with a firm conviction that the 
audience will draw instructive inferences from the use of realism: 
Vous ne concevez pas l'effet que produiraient sur vous une 
scène réelle, des habits vrais, des discours proportionnés aux 
actions, des actions simples, des dangers dont il est impossible 
que vous n'ayez tremblé pour vos parents, vos amis, pour vous-
même? (166) 
[Can you not conceive of the effect that would be produced on 
you by a real setting, authentic costumes, dialogue suited to the 
situation, plain stories, dangers which would make it impossible 
for you not to tremble for your parents, your friends, yourself?] 
Of course there is a major difference here between Diderot's and States' notions 
of the precise phenomenological effect which these emissaries from the real world 
will have on the spectator. Diderot is concerned with the extent to which these 
things can coax the audience into participating in the illusion; States' view, on the 
other hand, is tempered with a healthy measure of Brecht. Nevertheless, it is 
plain that they share an interest in the corporeality of these real objects, and this 
is an important point of common ground. 
Another theorist whose work bears certain similarities to States' is 
Lessing. I am thinking especially of his analysis of the Laokoon statue group, in 
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which his approach is similar but his conclusions firmly opposed to the opinion 
of Aristotle quoted above. For example, there is his famous observation that: 
Einen andern Eindruck macht die Erzàhlung von jemands 
Geschrei; einen andern dieses Geschrei selbst. Das Drama, 
welches fur die lebendige Malerei des Schauspielers bestimmt 
ist, diirfte vielleicht eben deswegen sich an die Gesetze der 
materiellen Malerei strenger halten miissen. In ihm glauben 
wir nicht bloB einen schreienden Philoktet zu sehen und zu 
hôren; wir hôren und sehen wirklich schreien.5 
[The impression made by a description of someone screaming 
is very different from that of the scream itself. Drama, which 
is meant for the living art of the actor, should confine itself 
more strictly within the limits of material art. In it we do not 
merely imagine that we see and hear a screaming Philoctetes, 
we see and hear actual screams.] 
This concept is taken up again in the Hamburgische Dramaturgie, where Lessing 
makes the following argument: 
Herr Heufeld verlangt, daB, wenn Julie von iher Mutter 
aufgehoben wird, sich in ihrem Gesichte Blut zeigen soil. Es 
kann ihm lieb sein, daB dieses unterlassen worden. Die 
Pantomime muB nie bis zu dem Ekelhaften getrieben werden. 
Gut, wenn in solchen Fallen die erhitzte Einbildungskraft Blut 
zu sehen glaubt; aber das Auge muB es nicht wirklich sehen.6 
[Herr Heufeld insists that, when Julia is helped up by her 
mother, there should be blood visible on her face. He should 
be thankful this was omitted. The performance must never be 
taken to the point of repulsiveness. In such cases, it is good 
that our imaginations should convince us that we see blood; but 
the eye must not actually see any.] 
Aside from the obvious differences of opinion which we might expect to find 
between States and Lessing over the question of what "the limits of material art" 
actually were, we have here an idea which could have as easily come from the 
pen of States as that of Lessing. In fact, there is even a particular point of 
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divergence between States and Lessing which points to a somewhat similar 
theoretical assumption. States is very much interested in the way in which the 
theatre stimulates a certain response in the spectator which he calls 
"preconventional shock" (42). Briefly, what he is referring to is that disturbance 
to a spectator's expectations which is engendered by a phenomenon perceived out 
of its usual context, and placed on a stage. 
Of course this is not a concept which is the exclusive province of the 
theatre. Examples in visual art abound: one thinks of Marcel Duchamp's urinal 
or its more recent progeny, Andre Serano's crucifix in urine, "Pisschrist"; of 
Andy Warhol's soup cans; and of the numerous examples back through the whole 
history of art such as the introduction of foreshortening, perspective, shadow, and 
so on. There are also analogues to be found in music (such as Berlioz's 
introduction of certain percussion instruments into the symphony or Bob Dylan's 
introduction of intellectual lyrics to rock music); and Erich Auerbach's Mimesis 
gives some sense of the history of similar innovations in literature. 
What sets the theatre apart from its analogues—and it is here that we 
begin to see the common ground between States and Lessing—is the fact that it 
employs so many real entities such as human beings and chairs, rather than 
merely representing the objects; this is what Carlson, following Charles Peirce, 
has called "iconicity." Now, the majority of theorists would hesitate to claim 
special status for the theatre on such grounds, or if they did, they would be 
careful not to carry the argument very far, for they would acknowledge that 
iconicity is present to varying degrees in other works of art (e.g., Berlioz's bells 
or Duchamp's urinal). Lessing and States, however, are both determined that 
such similarities between the arts should not be allowed to obscure their essential 
differences. For Lessing this means that there are certain aesthetic protocols 
which should not be breached; viz. agony should be variously represented 
according to the phenomenal character of the medium in question. For States, a 
son of the modern age, this means that theatre may be regarded as especially 
privileged as concerns the pursuit of iconoclasm—or perhaps, in light of the 
particular discussion and jargon, it would be more appropriate to say the pursuit 
of "iconoplasty." 
It appears likely that both States and Lessing, along with Diderot and 
Aristotle, made these arguments with the intention of rescuing the analysis of 
theatre from misleading abstractions. That is to say, they are all concerned to 
assert the importance of what the spectator actually experiences as against 
dwelling exclusively upon what she may be supposed to understand from the 
performance. As such, in the remarks cited, and in most similar passages, there 
is a lucid reasoning and a use of concrete imagery which calls upon the reader's 
own theatrical experiences for evidential support. This is, as I say, the case with 
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most such passages, but whereas in the earlier examples these were isolated 
observations set within broader arguments, in States' case we are presented with 
an entire book investigating the implications of such an approach. It is not 
surprising, then, to find States now and then looking beyond the theory of drama 
proper to philosophical tradition in order to give his observations authority and 
cogency. 
The most pertinent philosophical tradition is, of course, Phenomenology. 
The relationship it bears to States' work, however, is not straightforward. On the 
first page of the introduction to Great Reckonings in Little Rooms: On the 
Phenomenology of Theater States has placed a sort of disclaimer to his subtitle 
where he writes that his book "is not even a phenomenology of the theater, 
properly speaking" (1). This does rather beg the question of whether there is not 
a more appropriate name for what States is doing. Frankly, the answer seems to 
be, "No." He offers the clarification that his approach is "phenomenological in 
the sense that it focuses on the activity of theater making itself out of its essential 
materials" (1), but this is of little use if one does not have, in the first place, a 
clear understanding of phenomenology to which one can make adjustments. 
Therefore, while States' disclaimer suggests that any attempt to draw 
connections between his work and that of the Phenomenologists would end in 
frustration, and while anything like a comprehensive précis of the 
phenomenological approach to aesthetics most certainly lies far beyond the scope 
of this paper, it will nevertheless be instructive to refer to a few of 
Phenomenology's more relevant ideas. I myself have been using the word 
"phenomenological" in a rather cavalier manner thus far, so it may be wise, for 
a start, to define the term as it is understood by philosophers. The definition 
offered by the Encyclopaedia Britannica is as even-handed as any: 
In the 20th century, Phenomenology is mainly used as the name 
for a philosophical movement the primary objective of which is 
the direct investigation and description of phenomena as 
consciously experienced, without theories about their causal 
explanation and as free as possible from unexamined 
preconceptions and presuppositions.7 
The philosopher whose name is most integrally associated with 
Phenomenology is Edmund Husserl; consequently a sketch of the basic tenets of 
this school must center on his writings, especially his principal work, Ideas 
Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. 
Although it is extremely difficult, this book continues to stand as the central 
authority in the field, providing the most comprehensive introduction to 
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Phenomenology yet written. Because of the labyrinthine route through all the 
foundation work which is apparently necessary to his argument, Husserl does not 
get around to declaring the fundamental purpose of the work until the following 
passage, located in the second chapter: 
In these studies we shall go as far as necessary to effect the 
insight at which we are aiming, namely the insight that 
consciousness has, in itself, a being of its own which in its own 
absolute essence, is not touched by the phenomenological 
exclusion. It therefore remains as the "phenomenological 
residuum, " as a region of being which is of essential necessity 
quite unique and which can indeed become the field of a science 
of a novel kind: phenomenology.8 
In plain terms, I take this to mean that if from the consciousness of something, 
one takes away the something, what is left over is pure consciousness. From this 
(to my mind) basically Cartesian assumption, Husserl goes on to argue that the 
essential quality of the act of consciousness is its "intentionality," by which he 
means its quality of being "directed toward" an object. Having directed itself 
towards an object, the consciousness embraces a multiplicity of intuitions. These 
may be broken down into intuitions of the "immanent" and intuitions of the 
"transcendent," which we can characterize respectively as—and I am simplifying 
wildly here—thoughts about thinking and thoughts about other things.9 It is the 
difficult task of phenomenology to arrest the conscious act within that hair's 
breadth in which it may be grasped by "immanent" intuition, but has not yet 
become coloured by interpretation. 
The methodology which Husserl recommends for this task follows a 
three phase structure. Briefly, this consists of: 1) "phenomenological reduction," 
in which everything in question is changed into a phenomenon knowable by some 
mode of consciousness (i.e., intuition, imagination, recollection, etc.); 2) "eidetic 
reduction," in which that which is continuous among all the multiplicity of 
consciousnesses is isolated; and 3) "transcendental reduction," the central feature 
of which is "time awareness," the element necessary to any formation of 
meaning.10 Husserl worked on explicating this third phase all his life: it is best 
understood, I think, as a bridge between the immanent and the transcendent 
intuitions which offers, as a common context, the passage of time. 
All this is very interesting, but for the purposes at hand there is little 
point in dwelling on Husserl's ideas at such length if we do not trace them out 
through States' argument. Beginning, then, with the last mentioned of Husserl's 
ideas, there are certain links apparent between the concept of the "time 
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awareness" necessary to his "transcendental reduction" and some of the 
statements made by States regarding his concept of catharsis as a "purgative 
reckoning" with time, a concept which he introduces in the following passage: 
. . . catharsis is our best word for what takes place at large in 
the theater. It is precisely a purging: what is purged, at least 
on the level that concerns me here, is time—the menace of 
successiveness, of all life falling haphazardly through time into 
accident and repetition . . . [A] play plucks human experience 
from time and offers an aesthetic completion to a process we 
know to be endless. The play imitates the timely in order to 
remove it from time, to give time a shape. (49-50) 
For those who have read Frank Kermode's The Sense of an Ending, the book 
which provoked much of the current discussion of "closure" and related aspects 
of narrative, States' observation will have a familiar ring and will raise the 
question of how the theatre may be said to have any special status among the 
diachronic arts where this "purgative reckoning" is concerned. The implicit 
response to this challenge would seem to be the same point which, as I have 
already remarked, is stressed by both States and Lessing: that in the theatre 
"human action represents human action." So, to conflate what, for convenience's 
sake, I will characterize as the Kermodian with the Husserlian, we can see how 
the direct representation of an action would entail the same phenomenological 
experience as that sketched by Husserl for a "real" action, but in meeting the 
transcendental ego could be said to demand a special implementation of "time 
awareness." 
To rephrase this idea more precisely: suppose we assume that, as Husserl 
argues, the transcendental ego makes a link between the subjective passing of time 
(sensed through immanent intuition) and the passing of time in the objective world 
(sensed through transcendent intuition), and thereby arrives at the concept 
"reality"; would the peculiar ordering (or disordering) of time offered by the 
fictive representation of time—that time in which the end is immanent, which 
Frank Kermode has identified with the Aquinine aevum, a "third order of 
duration, distinct from time and eternity"11—then alter the task of the 
transcendental ego in a way which would educe a specific combination of 
phenomenological intuitions? Given the premises of the dialectic, we must 
answer in the affirmative. 
Furthermore, if we also accept with Lessing and States that the theatre 
"consumes" reality more directly than the other arts, we find that we must then 
support States' contention that the phenomenology of theatre is unique. Again, 
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such an idea may be something less than mint-new: this is pretty much the same 
point which Diderot makes—albeit much more succinctly—when he declares that 
theatre is a "different world." 
So much for the last of the concepts I have drawn from Husserl. As for 
a comparison of the rest of Husserl's argument with Great Reckonings, it will be 
immediately apparent to the reader that States has no pretensions to anything like 
the scientific objectivity to which German Phenomenology aspired; he does not, 
as it were, "play hardball" with the philosophers. That may be just as well, 
because Phenomenology's claim to scientific objectivity is by no means 
unproblematic: Jean-Paul Sartre, for example, would undoubtedly argue that such 
an enterprise was quixotic in that it attempts to objectify the unobjectifiable. In 
the Existentialist view, "being" is in a constant state of "becoming"; there is, 
therefore, no fixed subject which experiences but merely the stream of experience 
itself. States, however, never purports to offer anything more objective than a 
discussion of his own experiences as a representation of "everyman's" 
relationship to the stage, and thus—either through shrewdness or modesty—avoids 
this pitfall. 
Husserl's concept of "intentionality" may cause us to glance uneasily at 
some of the passages in Great Reckonings, for experiences like the 
"preconventional shock" by which States is wont to set so much store hardly seem 
to be "intentional" in the usual sense of the word—that is to say "willed." 
Reading closely, however, it is apparent that Husserl's use of the word to refer 
to the directedness of consciousness toward something has less to do with "will" 
than what we would probably think of as "noticing" something—a concept which 
is not at all incongruent with States' ideas. 
Perhaps the most important point of concurrence between States and 
Husserl lies in their assumption that a conscious act may be said to have an 
existence independent of interpretation (and, we might add, the complementary 
assumption that this fact is of some importance). The most important point of 
divergence between the two men is simply that Husserl does not discuss the 
theatre, or, indeed, venture significantly into the realm of aesthetics at all, and for 
his part States does not wade very deeply into the waters of the phenomenality of 
consciousness. If we are to assess, then, the question of how far States may be 
justified in his assertions insofar as phenomenology provides a sort of "subtext," 
it is necessary to move beyond Husserl to draw on the work of his successors in 
the field. For present purposes, the most important statement on the subject is 
made by Mikel Dufrenne in The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience. 
Dufrenne founds his argument on a carefully drawn distinction between 
the "work of art" and the "aesthetic object": 
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The work of art is the perduring structural foundation for the 
aesthetic object. It has a constant being which is not dependent 
on being experienced, while the aesthetic object exists only as 
appearance, that is only as experienced by the spectator . . . As 
aesthetically perceived, however, the work of art becomes an 
aesthetic object. It gains a strictly aesthetic, or felt, dimension 
which it lacked as a work of art. This metamorphosis is 
contingent in the sense that it depends on a specific act of 
perception to effect it, but it is noncontingent insofar as the 
telos, truth, and vocation of the work of art are found in the 
aesthetic object . . .The aesthetic object is simply the work of 
art as perceived—and perceived for its own sake.12 
This parallels the distinction States makes between theatre as semiotic object and 
theatre as phenomenological object. As semiotic object the theatrical performance 
in question may be understood to comprise a constant quantity of potential signs, 
whether or not they are recognized by a given spectator. As phenomenological 
object, a given theatrical performance can be identified only insofar as it is 
experienced. The difference between States' approach and that of Dufrenne is 
that while Dufrenne is at great pains to demonstrate that the aesthetic object 
comprises the significant as well as the sensuous, States, in an effort to assert the 
distance between his analysis and that of the semioticians, glances at the 
significant but affords special treatment to the sensuous aspects of the theatrical 
experience. 
It seems fair at this point to demand plainly what the use of approaching 
art phenomenologically might be. What is to be gained from such an approach 
that would be missing from a purely semiotic analysis? Of course, Dufrenne has 
in part answered the question in the passage which is quoted above: the aesthetic 
object contains the "vocation" of the work of art. He advances this argument a 
little further when he reasons: 
. . . if we consider the perceived object, the unity of the 
sensuous-as-matter and of form is in fact indecomposable. 
Form is form not only in uniting the sensuous but also in giving 
it its éclat. It is a quality {vertu) of the sensuous . . . Because 
of form, the aesthetic object ceases to exist as a mere means of 
reproducing a real object and comes to exist by itself. Its truth 
is not outside it, in a reality which it imitates, but within itself. 
This ontological self-sufficiency which form bestows on the 
sensuous which it unifies allows us to say that the aesthetic 
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object is nature. The sensuous as fixed, given form and life, 
finally becomes an object, constituting a nature which has the 
anonymous, blind force of Nature. (91) 
With little difficulty, this concept of the "ontological self-sufficiency" of the 
sensuous as experienced through the form of the aesthetic object may be related 
to the concept States speaks of as "the thing" in this passage where he argues that: 
. . . theater and primitive ritual, however different in social 
function, share an energy and structure that one can detect in 
the Wednesday evening play-reading group as easily as one can 
in the enactment of the Passion in the Easter service. The ritual 
in theater is based in the community's need for the thing that 
transpires in theater and in the designation, or self-designation, 
of certain individuals who, for one reason or another, consent 
to become the embodiment of this thing. (157) 
Such an understanding may very well be dismissed as mystic, but surely there 
must be something to be said for these sorts of considerations; otherwise our sole 
concern would arguably be the theatre's efficiency as a communicative vehicle. 
Of course communication is an extremely important aspect of our interest in the 
theatre, but, plainly, nearly as important an aspect is the theatre's capacity to give 
shape to our emotional or sensual energies in a manner which arouses our 
interest, or, as States would have it, its capacity to fulfill a certain need by 
providing a "thing" for the exchange of certain energies. 
The discussion has, inevitably, come to the point where we must 
compare States' assertions with our own experience. When all is said and done, 
this is the most important testing ground, for the sort of experiences which States 
attempts to describe are, by definition, subjective. Assuming, then, that we can 
recognize a number of the phenomena of which States speaks—such as the 
virtuosity of an actor perceived together with the action of the character whom he 
is playing, or the dogginess of a dog which, in our minds, refuses to be 
transfigured into that which it has been enlisted to represent—the important 
question then becomes whether States is correct in assigning these phenomena a 
role exterior to the semiotic. The question has been answered in part already; but 
with the various theoretical and philosophical contexts which have now been 
discussed in mind, it will be useful to confront some of the problems with States' 
argument a little more directly. If we suppose States to be wrong, there are a 
limited number of ways in which he can be in error. To this end, I have prepared 
a series of challenges which seem to encompass any arguments which could 
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reasonably be pitched against States. These are, I think, the sort of arguments 
that a skeptical semiotician might present to States were he given the opportunity; 
I will attempt to investigate the extent to which these challenges can be met with 
an adequate response. 
The first two of the following arguments are inherent to the semiotic 
approach, which does not recognise itself to be concerned with anything less than 
the whole of the theatrical presentation—which, in the semiotic view, is made 
wholly apparent through the signs it comprises. The next two arguments might 
be considered to be based on the logical complications of detaching ourselves 
from the belief that the entirety of the theatrical experience may be explained in 
terms of semiotic codes. It is the problem of deciding where one is putting down 
one's other foot as it were. The last argument is a quibble from the point of view 
of the history of dramatic theory with States' (tacit) claim to importance as a 
serious contributor to the theory of drama. 
1. States defines semiotics too narrowly. 
. . . in the present context we might define semiotics as the 
scientific analysis of the means, or apparatus, of the mimetic 
process. In other words, what mimetic theory and semiotics 
have in common is that they see theater as a process of 
mediation between artist and culture, speaker and listener; 
theater becomes a passageway for a cargo of meanings being 
carried back to society (after artistic refinement) via the 
language of signs. [. . . But] the danger of a linguistic 
approach is that one is apt to look past the site of our sensory 
engagement with its empirical objects. This site is the point at 
which art is no longer only language. When the critic posits a 
division in the art image, he may be saying something about 
language, but he is no longer talking about art, or at least the 
affective power of art. (6) 
Certainly one can appreciate States' concern in this matter. Admittedly, there is 
too much semiotic analysis that seems less an efficient and effective means of 
understanding a theatrical performance than a self-enclosed language game. But 
is this the fault of semiotics in itself, or merely the stylistic weakness of the 
particular authors? Against the evidence of some of the more turgid and obscure 
writers who lack sensitivity to the affective considerations of their subject, there 
is the example of Roland Barthes, whom States cites extensively. A close 
examination of Barthes' work, however, reveals how frequently he assumes what 
28 Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism 
States would call a phenomenological position, just as States may often be seen 
to have brought a semiotic approach to bear in his own work. We do well to keep 
in mind the view of Dufrenne, that the aesthetic experience necessarily comprises 
both the significant and the sensuous. This suggests that the remark States makes 
about the two approaches constituting a sort of binocular vision is reasonably 
close to the mark. On the other hand, those areas in which States seems to drift 
into a slightly more polemic position against semiotic theory should be taken with 
a grain of salt. 
2. Everything on stage exists within a theatrical frame and therefore has 
significance as a referent to a system of codes. 
Certainly everything is semiotically construable, but do we actually apply 
this theatrical frame consistently? Surely we have all experienced occasions when 
certain elements of a performance were so startling to the audience that the 
theatrical illusion was broken. Moreover, there is the phenomenon of the actor's 
virtuosity which States expounds at length in the second part of his book. In 
short, one does, as States suggests, witness a play as an event in the real world 
as well as an illusion of an "unreal world" (119-20). 
Now there is no doubt that, the theatrical illusion having been broken, 
there are other systems of codes which may be brought to bear upon the theatrical 
experience; but there remains the question of whether the audience does in fact 
fill in every fissure in one system of codes, or if there are moments when certain 
phenomena are experienced sensuously, not significantly. 
To look at the question from a different point of view, we might consider 
what it means to bring external contexts to theatrical perception—that is to say, 
systems of codes which exist outside the realm of theatrical illusion. 
Theoretically, if the theatrical frame remains unbroken regardless of the presence 
of theatrical illusion, the entire world might become framed theatrically in a so-
called performance of unbounded time and space, assuming that a spectator was 
informed of the enterprise. One would expect that the spectator would have 
lapses of attention, but theoretically these would not be any different from those 
lapses which States is arguing occur for virtually every spectator at virtually every 
performance. Logically, then, if all theatrical perception is semiotic, it would 
necessarily follow that all of perception was semiotic. I am sure that there are 
certain theorists who would insist that this is in fact so, but such an assertion 
seems to me to run contrary to common sense. Arguably, a person who engaged 
with every one of his perceptions of real life in a semiotic manner would suffer 
from a disease similar to that of the protagonist in Nabokov's story, "Signs and 
Symbols." What seems more reasonable is to argue that all perception is 
semiotically construable, although there are many perceptions which remain 
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unconstrued. It also seems reasonable to assert that, if there is such a thing as 
non-semiotically construed perception, it is unrealistic to believe that it can be 
turned off completely by the members of a theatrical audience. 
3. Supposing there are moments where understanding of phenomena as signifier s 
lapses, States suggests incorrectly that certain objects are more phenomenological 
than others. 
Dogs, clocks, children and fountains are, States argues, among the 
objects most resistant to theatrical use. These objects resist theatrical framing, 
he suggests, because of the strength of their "real-life" associations. The 
argument presents us with a peculiar idea to grapple with, because, at least in the 
case of the clock, the resistance to theatrical framing occurs because the semiotic 
associations with the object from everyday life are so strong that they overwhelm 
its representative function. Given that States has toyed with a polemic distinction 
between phenomenology and semiotics, we are therefore inclined in that instance 
to reject his argument out of hand. Yet looking at the other objects—fountains 
and dogs—we are moving away from the idea of a purely semiotic association and 
closer to a sensual association, although the semiotic is undoubtedly still 
important. A further complication comes into the argument when States looks at 
the ways in which an actor like Laurence Olivier resists our complete 
identification of him with the character he is playing. Clearly, it is because of the 
number of preconceptions we bring into the theatre with us that Olivier and these 
other objects resist a completely mimetic function, but in what way does that 
make them more phenomenological? 
The problem seems to demand a restructuring of the argument. First of 
all, I think we must, with Dufrenne, understand the phenomenology of aesthetic 
experience to comprise both the significant and the sensuous; then, we can agree 
that among the various semiotic codes presented by a theatrical production, the 
mimetic ranks with the most important. It then seems correct to assume that the 
success of a mimetic code depends on the degree to which the objects presented 
in the production are understood as signs of a represented thing. In this context, 
then, we can say that there are certain objects or performers (such as those cited 
above) which seem more resistant than others to having their customary 
associations (both significant and sensual) altered in a way which allows them to 
function smoothly as signs within the mimetic code. It may then be said of these 
objects that they have phenomenological associations of a strength sufficient to 
resist semiotic manipulation. 
4. States does not explain the phenomenological experience fully; he is mystifying 
as to its real nature. 
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This is undoubtedly true. States' argument often lacks the sort of rigour 
which we might have hoped for. This may partially be due to the style of 
publication: the book was originally brought out in a series which the University 
of California Press intended for single evening readings. The result is something 
like a chat delivered by an informed spectator, a fact which States cheerfully 
admits in his introduction. The style frequently makes for extremely engaging 
reading, but there are times when States leaves the reader without a strong 
theoretical foothold, so to speak. 
My sketch of a slightly broader context for States' approach was, in part, 
an attempt to compensate for whatever shortcomings of theoretical rigour may 
exist. Unfortunately, there is only so much that can be done in this regard, for 
beyond a certain point one is no longer explicating States' argument, but altering 
it to suit the parameters of a more scientific type of discourse. In part the 
problem is inherent to the subject, for in attempting to articulate the experience 
of an object as a phenomenological whole, without dissecting it into its significant 
parts, there are limits to what can be said with any degree of clarity. In other 
words, one can go just so far in explaining a phenomenon before one begins to 
analyze what it means, and at that point, one has begun to regard the object 
semiotically. That will always be the greatest drawback to any phenomenological 
analysis.13 
On the other hand, by comparison with the elaborate mystifications of 
common experiences which one encounters in the work of the German 
Phenomenologists, Great Reckonings certainly sustains an admirable lucidity. If 
States has not anchored much of his argument to scientifically reasoned theory, 
to his credit he has attempted to secure a great many vague impressions in an 
evocation of the actualities of theatre as experienced by a real spectator. 
5. States expands a tiny element of our experience into a disproportionately 
important role. 
This point is so very subjective that it is difficult to answer reasonably. 
Indeed, some might complain that States has been too restrictive in the limitations 
he imposes on theatrical phenomena. At any rate, if we can at least agree for the 
sake of argument that non-semiotic aspects of phenomenology are integral to the 
theatrical experience to at least some degree, it is only fair to States that time be 
taken to review the various implications which are consequent to this premise 
before the reader makes his or her own judgement about its importance. 
To begin with, we may once again look to the opinion which States 
shares with Lessing: that one of the principal differences between theatre and the 
other arts is evinced in the effects which ensue its use of real human action. If 
this idea is important, it is a distinction which carries well beyond the particular 
Spring 1997 81 
areas which Lessing looked at, for this would be one of the most important means 
of distinguishing between the essence of theatre and that of film or television. 
Furthermore, from the vantage point of this phenomenological distinction, we 
have a means of asserting that the reading of a drama, no matter how replete with 
every imaginable description and stage direction, can never duplicate a spectator's 
experience of a theatrical presentation. 
Of at least equal importance (although unfortunately abstruse to a degree 
which depletes the idea of much of its potential persuasive power) is States' 
concept of the "purgative reckoning" with time which the theatre affords. Given 
the diachronic structure of a play, we must relate this to Dufrenne's concept of 
form giving shape and unity to the sensuous aspects of consciousness. These two 
ideas are really part of the same phenomenon: an audience is cast in a certain role 
(or number of roles) by a performance, and to the extent to which they accept this 
and participate in the event, they become integrated with the material of the work 
of art, the piece of theatre. This is more than simply a matter of "getting caught 
up in the illusion," although that is undoubtedly a part of the experience. If I 
understand (and conflate) States and Dufrenne correctly, the essential 
phenomenological awareness of the corporeality of the objects in question, 
coupled with the participation in the process of illusion, affords a transcendental 
opportunity which is set apart from the usual transcendental work of the ego. It 
is, in a manner of speaking, an exercise which offers us a chance to alter relations 
with the material world. It should be stressed that States never becomes so 
explicitly mystical—not on such a grand scale, at any rate. The closest he ever 
comes is in his discussion of "the thing" that ritual and theatre share. 
Finally, there is a further concept arising from the premise of the non-
semiotic aspects of the phenomenology of theatre which carries implications 
reaching beyond the immediate field of drama to other discussions of how human 
consciousness may be understood. Briefly, it is this: if there are aspects of 
theatrical experience which are extra-linguistic—which, in other words, cannot 
be reduced to semiotic codes—this means that any model of the human relation 
to theatrical performance (even the most elaborate hypothetical model) would be 
incomplete. This bears a very close analogy to one of the current arguments 
about the impossibility of creating "strong" artificial intelligence: that is to say, 
of building a machine which thinks exactly like a human in terms of creativity and 
intuition as well as logic and memory. 
Control engineering, which shares much of the vocabulary of semiotics, 
describes the system of codes by which any machine is able to operate as its 
"algorithms." Even the most advanced computer imaginable may be reduced to 
an algorithmic sequence, and therefore a formal system of mathematical codes. 
However, there is a mathematical theorem, called Gôdel's theorem, which states 
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that "whatever formal system [a mathematician] might adopt as the criterion of 
truth, there will always be mathematical propositions . . . that his algorithm 
cannot provide an answer for."14 A number of scientists have attempted to use 
this theorem to demonstrate the impossibility of strong A-I. One of the most 
successful and perhaps the best known such attempt is made by Roger Penrose in 
The Emperor's New Mind. Penrose's argument marches through relativity theory, 
cosmology, quantum physics and microbiology, to arrive at the conclusion that 
inspiration, creativity and various intuitions—including certain aesthetic 
insights—lie beyond the scope of any algorithmic system. Most pertinently, 
among the proofs he cites for this argument are the examples of "non-verbality" 
of thought and animal consciousness. 
To bring this analogy back to the discussion at hand, we can see by 
inference that Penrose's math also suggests that no system of semiotic codes 
would ever be able to encompass a spectator's mind; there would always be 
elements of consciousness at work which were proscribed, so to speak, by the 
culturally established codes. If this is true, if there is something in the theatrical 
experience which is not reducible to the semiotic code, and supposing this aspect 
of experience to be of some importance, the natural question becomes one of 
where it is one might find evidence of such consciousness. At present, it seems 
that the most promising answers, whatever their shortcomings, are to be found in 
the phenomenology of theatre as States has helped us to understand it. 
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